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INTRODUCTION 
A. The Legal Context for RLUIPA 
The past three decades have seen startling changes in the way 
courts approach disputes involving claims by individuals or religious 
institutions that local land use regulations have infringed on rights 
protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious freedom.1  
 
*Associate Professor & Director, Law & Public Policy Program, Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law and Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University. 
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment reads: “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise there-
of . . . .” The religion clauses of the First Amendment were held applicable to the ac-
tions of state and local government through incorporation in the Fourteenth 
WEINSTEIN_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  9:29 AM 
1222 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
Prior to 1983, no federal court of appeals had considered a case in-
volving land use regulation of religious institutions.2  Such litigation 
was confined almost totally to state courts, which analyzed challenges 
to land use regulations based on a substantive due process analysis.3  
State courts split on the issue of whether religious institutions should 
be treated the same as any other institution, with land use controls 
subject only to rational basis review when challenged, or whether re-
ligious institutions should be entitled to preferential treatment, with 
challenges to land use controls subjected to heighted scrutiny.  The 
majority of states favored the latter approach.4 
In 1983, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal each ap-
plied a balancing test based on the Supreme Court’s free exercise cas-
es to uphold a zoning regulation that excluded a house of worship 
from a particular zoning district.5  In the wake of those decisions, zon-
ing disputes increasingly shifted to the federal courts and several 
states reconsidered their doctrinal approach to such disputes, either 
modifying the due process analysis to eliminate preferential treatment 
for religious institutions or shifting to a free exercise balancing test.6 
The next significant change came in 1990, when the U.S. Supreme 
Court unexpectedly abandoned its strict scrutiny standard for free ex-
ercise claims.  In that year’s Smith decision, the Court announced that 
courts should not grant exemptions from neutral laws of general ap-
plicability, such as land use regulations, even where these laws sub-
stantially burden religious freedom.7  The Smith decision was widely 
denounced by religious groups, which lobbied for Congressional ac-
tion to “restore” the strict scrutiny standard that the Court had dis-
carded in Smith.8  That effort led to the enactment of the federal Re-
 
Amendment
 
in Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (establishment clause) 
and Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (free exercise clause). 
 2. See Richard J. Roddewig, Recent Developments in Land Use, Planning and 
Zoning, 21 URB. LAW. 769, 806 (1989). 
 3. See BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & 
LITIGATION 661 (2011). 
 4. See id. §§ 7.10–7.12. 
 5. See Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, Fla., 721 F.2d 729, 734 (11th Cir. 1983); 
Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 
Ohio, 699 F.2d 303, 306 (6th Cir. 1983).  
 6. See BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note3, at §§ 7:13–14. 
 7. See Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
 8. See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1691 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 22 
(1999) (statement of Von G. Keetch, Counsel, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints); id. at 91 (statement of Rabbi David Saperstein, Director and Counsel, Reli-
gious Action Center of Reform Judaism); id. at 130 (statement of Oliver S. Thomas, 
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ligious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993;9 however, RFRA 
proved to be short-lived.  In 1997, the Court held that the Act was un-
constitutional as it applied to state and local governments, ruling that 
it exceeded the authority of Congress under the enforcement clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and violated separation of powers 
principles.10  Although RFRA was gone, a number of states had en-
acted their own religious freedom statutes in reaction to Smith and 
these were, of course, unaffected by the Court’s action.11 
In 2000, after two failed efforts,12 Congress enacted a new religious 
freedom statute, the Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons 
Act (RLUIPA), which was explicitly drafted to cure the constitution-
al defects that had doomed RFRA.13  As opposed to the broad reach 
 
Special Counsel for Religious and Civil Liberties, National Council of Churches); Re-
ligious Liberty: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on Issues Relating to 
Religious Liberty Protection, and Focusing on the Constitutionality of a Religious 
Protection Measure, 106th Cong. 36 (statement of Michael P. Farris, President, 
Home School Legal Defense Association); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507, 514–15 (1997) (acknowledging that public criticism of the Court’s ruling in Smith 
led to the passage of RFRA).  The hostility of religious and political groups to the 
Smith decision
 
was not abated in the least by the Court’s 1993 ruling in Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), that facially neutral 
laws which are found to target religion are not neutral laws of general applicability 
and remain subject to strict scrutiny. 
 9. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2006), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1988 (2006), 2000(bb) et seq. (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). See generally Doug-
las Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (1994). 
 10. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508.  RFRA remains constitutional as applied to the 
federal government. See, e.g., Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(holding Boerne inapplicable to instances where RFRA was not being applied to 
States); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1120 
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Supreme Court “invalidated RFRA only as applied 
to state and local law”). 
 11. See BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 3, § 7:6. See generally Douglas 
Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755 (1999) 
[hereinafter Laycock, State RFRAs]; Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty after 
Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010). 
 12. See The Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. 
(1997), and The Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. 
(1999).  Each would have had the effect of restoring the strict scrutiny test to any 
state law that came within: (1) Congressional authority under the Commerce and 
Spending Clauses and (2) the Enforcement Clause test in City of Boerne v. Flores. 
See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story 
Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311 
(2003) [hereinafter Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good]. 
 13. See 146 CONG. REC. S6678-02, S6687-88 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of 
Sen. Hatch).  For contrasting views on the need for and constitutionality of RLUIPA, 
compare Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional 
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of the Religious Liberty Protection Acts that had been rejected in 
1998 and 1999, RLUIPA, as its name indicated, applied in only two 
contexts: land use and prisons.14  As regards land use, it restored the 
strict scrutiny test for land use regulations that impose a substantial 
burden on religious expression and added prohibitions on discrimi-
nating against or excluding religious institutions.15  This Article exam-
ines the effect of RLUIPA’s land use provisions on local govern-
ments.16 
B. The Social Context for RLUIPA 
The past three decades have seen significant changes to the social 
context in which disputes occur over the application of local zoning 
and historic preservation ordinances to houses of worship and other 
“religious” property.  These disputes have become more prevalent.17 
 
Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929 (2001) (positive view of statute), with 
Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitutional Limitations on Congress’s Power Over Local 
Land Use: Why the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act is Uncon-
stitutional, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 366 (2009) [hereinafter Hamilton, Constitutional 
Limitations] and Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good, supra note 12 (critical 
views of statute). See also Bram Alden, Reconsidering RLUIPA: Do Religious Land 
Use Protections Really Benefit Religious Land Users?, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1779, 1783 
n.16 (2010). 
 14. See Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA and Federal-
ism: Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and Its Impact on Local 
Government, 40 URB. LAW. 195, 207–08 (2008) (discussing reasons the statute only 
covers land use and institutionalized persons). This Article considers only the land 
use provisions of RLUIPA. 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 (2005), the Court unanimously up-
held the constitutionality of RLUIPA’s institutionalized persons provision against a 
claim that it violated the establishment clause. See generally BLAESSER & 
WEINSTEIN, supra note 3, § 7:6, p. 716. 
 17. The author conducted three searches of the Westlaw ALLCASES database 
on February 7, 2012. The first, using the terms “Religious Freedom Restoration Act” 
and “zon!” with a date restriction of 1993–1997 to cover the period when RFRA was 
in force, produced forty-eight citations, with fewer than twenty involving a religious 
institution’s challenge to a land use regulation.  The second search, using the terms 
“Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act” and “zon! % inmate! prison!” 
with a date restriction of 2000–2004, covering a period from the enactment of 
RLUIPA roughly similar to the time RFRA was in force, produced sixty citations, 
fifty-nine of which were cases involving a religious institution’s challenge to a land 
use regulation.  In short, the number of challenges to land use regulations during the 
first four years RLUIPA was in force was 200 percent greater than the number of 
challenges during the four years RFRA was in force. A third search, using the terms 
“Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act” and zon! % inmate! prison!” 
with a date restriction of 2000–2012, produced 261 citations, a number of them in-
volving the same claim at different procedural steps, almost all of which were cases 
involving a religious institution’s challenge to a land use regulation. 
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Obviously, the enactment of RLUIPA itself has played a major role 
in that escalation,18 but there are larger factors at work that predate 
RLUIPA. 
First, houses of worship today are more likely to be perceived as in-
flicting negative effects on neighboring properties.  New churches, 
and older ones seeking to expand an existing use, are often signifi-
cantly larger than the churches of earlier eras and use their facilities 
more intensively.  In addition to religious services, many churches 
sponsor schools, day-care centers, adult education classes, a variety of 
programming serving different age groups, and various faith-based 
“support” groups.19  Some churches also provide shelter for the 
homeless and meals for the indigent.20  Many houses of worship also 
have venues where wedding receptions or bar/bat mitzvah celebra-
tions are held late into the night on weekends.  As church activities 
expand to twelve or more hours per day, seven days a week, neigh-
bors become increasingly concerned about the negative effects of the 
increased traffic, parking, noise, and late-night activity on property 
values. 
Of course, any new or expanded “non-residential” development 
proposed for a residential neighborhood—the traditional locale for 
houses of worship—is likely to be opposed by neighbors.  But the 
classic “NIMBY” phenomenon21 poses additional difficulties with re-
 
 18. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Goldfien, Thou Shalt Love Thy Neighbor: RLUIPA and 
the Mediation of Religious Land Use Disputes, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 435, 436 (2006) 
(arguing that RLUIPA “gives religious land owners an almost irresistible incentive to 
assert claims of religious discrimination if they face opposition to their use or pro-
posal, if only to gain strategic leverage in the land use approval process”). 
 19. See Heather M. Welch, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act and Mega-Churches: Demonstrating the Limits of Religious Land Use Exemp-
tions in Federal Legislation, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 255, 281–83 (2010). See generally 
Jennifer S. Evans-Cowley & Kenneth Pearlman, Six Flags Over Jesus: RLUIPA, 
Megachurches, and Zoning, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 203 (2008) (discussing the growth of 
mega-churches and their impact on local zoning regulations); David A. Zucco, Super-
Sized with Fries: Regulating Religious Land Use in the Era of Megachurches, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 416 (2003) (exploring the unique zoning challenges presented by 
mega-churches); Jim Schwab, Zoning and Big Box Religion, ZONING NEWS (Am. 
Planning Ass’n, Chicago, IL), Nov. 1996, at 1 (discussing the emergence of 
“megachurches” that can have a substantial impact on surrounding land uses). 
 20. See, e.g., Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 
11493 (LMM), 2004 WL 2471406 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2004), aff’d, 177 Fed. Appx. 198 
(2d Cir. 2006); W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 849 F. Supp. 77 
(D.D.C. 1994). 
 21. NIMBY, an acronym for “not in my backyard,” refers to organized opposition 
to proposed land uses proximate to existing residential communities. See generally 
Kurt F. Pantzer Jr., NIMBY: Opposing a Land Use Change, 5 PROB. & PROP. 28 
(1991). 
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spect to houses of worship because of recent changes in the manner in 
which Americans worship.  Where previous generations attended 
houses of worship in their own neighborhoods, commentators have 
noted that today, “religious institutions serve populations that are less 
and less centered in the geographic communities in which they are lo-
cated.”22  Thus, a proposed house of worship is likely to be seen by its 
neighbors as providing few benefits—since most of them will not be 
members—while imposing burdens such as increased traffic, parking 
difficulties, noise, and the potential for negative effects on property 
values. 
The rapidly increasing scope of our religious diversity may also be 
a factor in some land use disputes involving religious institutions.  
Traditionally, the major religious institutions in most American 
communities were those affiliated with the Catholic Church or “main-
stream” Protestant denominations such as Lutheran, Baptist, Meth-
odist, and Presbyterian, with larger cities also home to a variety of 
Jewish, Eastern Orthodox, and smaller Christian denominations.23 In 
contrast, today’s fastest-growing religious groups—Mormon, Evan-
gelical Christian, Orthodox Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, and ultra-
Orthodox Jewish24—which were previously either geographically iso-
lated (e.g., Mormons in Utah and ultra-Orthodox Jews in New York 
City) or only a minor presence until their numbers were swelled by 
 
 22. Marc D. Stern, Zoning for Churches: Guidelines, But No Magic Formula, 7 
RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 69, 70 (1997). 
 23. The increasing geographical diversity of minority religions can be documented 
at the Directory of Religious Centers, PLURALISM PROJECT HARV. U., http://plura 
lism.org/directory/index.php (last visited June 12, 2012) (7636 centers listed).  For a 
historical perspective on geographical changes for religious denominations, 
see EDWIN SCOTT GAUSTAD & PHILIP L. BARLOW, NEW HISTORICAL ATLAS OF RE-
LIGION IN AMERICA 357–94 (2000). 
 24. Studies of religious self-identification in the United States conducted in 1990, 
2001, and 2008 show that although the absolute number of adult Americans who self-
identify as “Christian” increased 14.66% between 1990 (151,225,000) and 2008 
(173,402,000), (a finding that is not unexpected given the overall population growth 
during that period), the percentage of adult Americans who self-identify as “Chris-
tian” fell from 86.2% in 1990 to 76% in 2008, a relative decrease of almost 12%.  
During that same period both the absolute number and the percentage of adult 
Americans who self-identify as “Other Religions” (i.e., non-Christian) rose from 
5,853,000 (3.3%) in 1990 to 8,796,000 (3.9%) in 2008.  Those numbers represent a 
population increase among adult non-Christians of over 50% and a relative increase 
of over 18% in the representation of non-Christian Americans in the general adult 
population.  See BARRY A. KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
IDENTIFICATION SURVEY (ARIS 2008) SUMMARY REPORT 3 tbl.1 (2009).  
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recent immigrants (e.g., Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, and Muslims)—
may be found in almost any American community.25 
At times, the entry of such “nonmainstream” groups into a com-
munity—or the local community’s reaction to it—can lead to land use 
conflicts.  A 1999 study of all then-reported cases in the zoning and 
land use context claims that its findings “strongly suggest that a high 
percentage of cases are being contested by religious groups compris-
ing a very small percentage of the total population.”26  This pattern 
appears to be continuing in the cases brought under RLUIPA.27  Why 
is this so?  On the one hand, the arrival of a new religious denomina-
tion—if it is small and impecunious—can lead to conflict if the mem-
bers of the fledgling congregation seek to worship or study regularly 
in a private home,28 rented storefront,29 or an industrially-zoned 
 
 25. See, e.g., Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 326 F. 
Supp. 2d 1140 (E.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (Sikhs in Yuba 
City, California); Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starksville, 876 F.2d 465 (5th 
Cir. 1989) (Muslims in Starksville, Mississippi); Cambodian Buddhist Soc’y of Conn., 
Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n of Newtown, 941 A.2d 868 (Conn. 2008) (Bud-
dhists in Newtown, Connecticut); Martin v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 747 N.E.2d 131 (Mass. 2001) (Mormons 
in Belmont, Massachusetts). 
 26. Von G. Keetch & Matthew K. Richards, The Need for Legislation to Enshrine 
Free Exercise in the Land Use Context, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 725, 739 tbl.2, 740 
(1999). 
 27. See, e.g., Roman P. Storzer, The Perspective of the Religious Land Use Ap-
plicant, in RLUIPA READER: RELIGIOUS LAND USES, ZONING AND THE COURTS 43, 
48 (Michael S. Giaimo & Lora A. Lucero eds., 2009) (“After eight years of RLUIPA, 
there can be little doubt that lawsuits are disproportionately brought by minority or 
nontraditional faith groups . . . .”); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RE-
PORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTION-
ALIZED PERSONS ACT 13 (2010) [hereinafter REPORT], available at http://www.justice. 
gov/crt/rluipa_report_092210.pdf (“Animus-based discrimination remains a priority.  
Jewish synagogues and schools, African-American churches, and, increasingly, Mus-
lim mosques and schools are particularly vulnerable to discriminatory zoning actions 
taken by local officials, often under community pressure.  Increasing hostility and 
misunderstanding requires vigilant enforcement of the law to prevent such actions 
and ensure officials understand their responsibilities.”). 
 28. See, e.g., Murphy v. Zoning Comm’n of New Milford, 289 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D. 
Conn. 2003), judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Murphy v. New Milford 
Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2005) (challenging attendance restriction on 
prayer meetings in a private home); Konikov v. Orange Cnty., Fla., 302 F. Supp. 2d 
1328 (M.D. Fla. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 410 F.3d 1317 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (challenging restriction on conducting religious services in a private home). 
 29. See, e.g., Dixon v. Town of Coats, No. 5:08-CV-489-BR, 2010 WL 2347506, at 
*1 (E.D.N.C. June 9, 2010); Chabad of Nova, Inc. v. City of Cooper City, 575 F. Supp. 
2d 1280, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Madain v. City of Stanton, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 447, 451 
(Ct. App. 2010). 
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building30 and the neighbors or local officials claim the property is not 
zoned for use as a house of worship. 
On the other hand, when a well-funded religious denomination ar-
rives and seeks approval for a new, large house of worship—a Mor-
mon temple31 or a “big box church”32 being paradigmatic cases—
neighbors or local officials may again object, citing such traditional 
zoning concerns as effect on property values, traffic, parking, land-
scaping, et cetera, as the basis for their opposition.  Local officials 
may also be concerned about erosion of the city’s tax base if too much 
property is acquired by tax-exempt religious institutions.33  Regretta-
bly, conflict may sometimes arise as a result of citizens’ and local offi-
cials’ antipathy for, and resulting discriminatory actions toward, the 
newly arrived or rapidly expanding denomination.34 
C. The Land Use Regulation Context for RLUIPA 
Although a lengthy description or discussion of local regulation of 
land use is well beyond the scope of this Article,35 it will be helpful to 
 
 30. See, e.g., Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 634 
F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 31. See, e.g., Martin v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 434 Mass. 141 (2001) (rejecting a neighbor’s challenge to 
the city’s exemption from normal height restrictions for a proposed eighty-three-foot 
high spire atop a Mormon temple). 
 32. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boul-
der Cnty., 612 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (D. Colo. 2009), aff’d, 613 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2010); 
see also supra text accompanying note 19. 
 33. See, e.g., Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. Supp. 
2d 1203, 1228 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (asserting that city denied church’s application to 
build on lot where city preferred to see commercial retail development center be-
cause of concerns about tax revenues). 
 34. Professor Douglas Laycock notes that there is suspicion of, or hostility to, re-
ligious intensity.  
People who are religious themselves are often hostile to unfamiliar faiths, to 
high intensity faiths, and to the conservative and evangelical churches asso-
ciated with the “Religious Right.” Thus in 1993, 45% of Americans admit-
ted to “mostly unfavorable” or “very unfavorable” opinions of “religious 
fundamentalists,” and 86% admitted to mostly or very unfavorable opinions 
of “members of religious cults or sects.” In 1989, 30% of Americans said 
they would not like to have ‘religious fundamentalists’ as neighbors, and 62 
percent said they would not like to have “members of minority religious 
sects or cults” as neighbors. A desire not to have members of a minority sect 
as neighbors is closely related to a desire not to have the minority sect’s 
church as a neighbor.  
Laycock, State RFRAs, supra note 11, at 760 (citations omitted). 
 35. Readers interested in such descriptions/discussions should consider reading 
one or more of the following sources: RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: 
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make some observations about the topic to provide a context for the 
discussion that follows in subsequent sections.  First, a major goal of 
almost all zoning ordinances has been, and remains, to segregate “in-
compatible” land uses, with a focus on ensuring that single-family res-
idential uses are shielded from more intensive multi-family residen-
tial, institutional, commercial and industrial uses.36  Second, many, if 
not most, zoning decisions that actually apply an ordinance to a spe-
cific request for a zoning approval have some degree of subjectivity.37  
Third, disputes over land use approvals can be seen as fitting into two 
broad categories that I will call “plan disputes” and “neighbor dis-
putes”; the categories are not mutually exclusive.  By “plan dispute,” I 
mean a dispute that arises when the zoning for a particular property 
allows “x” and the property owner or developer seeks approval for 
“y,” with “x” and “y” referring to one or more land use regulatory cri-
teria such as use, density, bulk, parking requirements, et cetera  A 
“plan dispute” can arise out of motivations associated with the public 
interest at one end of the spectrum (for example, an honest disagree-
ment about the appropriateness of the regulations applied to the 
property) or an interest in pure rent-seeking38 at the other.  By 
“neighbor dispute” I mean “NIMBY”39 opposition from neighboring 
 
MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES (1966); RICHARD F. BABCOCK & CHARLES L. 
SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED (1985); DWIGHT H. MERRIAM, THE COM-
PLETE GUIDE TO ZONING: HOW TO NAVIGATE THE COMPLEX AND EXPENSIVE MAZE 
OF ZONING, PLANNING, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND LAND-USE LAW (2004); RUTHERFORD 
H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY: GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY (rev. ed. 
2004); HERBERT H. SMITH, THE CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO ZONING (1983). 
 36. See Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 379–82 (1926) (es-
tablishing the constitutionality of zoning featuring a segregation of uses, which then 
became the norm for zoning); see also EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF’S THE 
LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1:5 (4th ed. 2011); Hamilton, Constitutional Limi-
tations, supra note 13, at 337–38.  While zoning’s segregation of uses is frequently 
modified by provisions, such as Planned Developments, allowing for a mix of uses, 
see, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENTS (2007), and there 
is a movement away from zoning based on uses and towards zoning based on “urban 
form,” particularly in larger cities, see, e.g., DANIEL G. PAROLEK ET AL., FORM 
BASED CODES: A GUIDE FOR PLANNERS, URBAN DESIGNERS, MUNICIPALITIES, AND 
DEVELOPERS 4–5 (2008); Final Code—May 2011, MIAMI 21: YOUR CITY, YOUR PLAN 
(May 26, 2011), http://www.miami21.org/final_code_May2011.asp (featuring a form-
based code adopted by Miami), segregation of uses remains the norm. 
 37. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: 
Lessons From RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 717, 733–37 (2008). 
 38. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1731, 1744–45 (1988) (discussing rent-seeking in the zoning context). 
 39. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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landowners, a common occurrence in zoning approval decisions,40 
which may be based on valid land use concerns,41 individual prejudic-
es that have little to do with land use,42 or some combination of the 
two.43  Fourth, local elected officials or their appointees, such as citi-
zen members of planning and zoning boards or commissions, view 
themselves as accountable to a constituency of citizens, and are thus 
likely to reflect their constituency’s opposition to a particular land use 
approval regardless of their personal views on the issue.44 
I.  RLUIPA BASICS 
A. Coverage and Claims 
RLUIPA’s “general rule” restores strict scrutiny to land use regu-
lations that impose a substantial burden on religious exercise,45 but 
does not attempt to define the term “substantial burden.”46  The 
 
 40. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 442–43 (1990) (discussing NIMBYism associated with a variety 
of land uses, with emphasis on the suburban context).  
 41. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Unintended Consequences RLUIPA Has Visited 
on Residential Neighborhoods, in RLUIPA READER: RELIGIOUS LAND USES, ZON-
ING AND THE COURTS 63–65 (Michael S. Giaimo & Lora A. Lucero eds., 2009) (argu-
ing that residential neighbors have valid concerns about the introduction or expan-
sion of more intense uses associated with religious institutions).  Often, opposition by 
neighbors stems from the fact that a proposed use or expansion of an existing use will 
provide diffused benefits but concentrated costs, and no mechanism exists whereby 
winners can compensate losers. Thus, for example, a new religious—or healthcare—
institution may benefit many people over a large geographical area but also inflict 
concentrated costs in the form of increased density, traffic, parking problems, and 
noise on the relatively few people who live in close proximity to the new develop-
ment. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay Atten-
tion?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787 (1994) (discussing the problem of diffused benefits, 
concentrated costs, and compensation mechanisms in the context of so-called LU-
LU’s: locally undesirable land uses). 
 42. See Storzer, supra note 27, at 43–45 (describing prejudicial views of neigh-
bors). 
 43. See id. (noting both valid and prejudicial concerns of neighbors). 
 44. See id. at 47. 
 45. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006). These sections require that 
governmental action that “impose[s] or implement[s] a land use regulation in a man-
ner that imposes a substantial burden on . . . religious exercise” be justified as “the 
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 
 46. See 146 CONG. REC.  S7774-01, Ex. 1, S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (Joint 
Statement of Sen. Hatch & Sen. Kennedy on the Religious Land Use and Institution-
alized Persons Act of 2000) (“The Act does not include a definition of the term ‘sub-
stantial burden’ because it is not the intent of this Act to create a new standard for 
the definition of ‘substantial burden’ on religious exercise.  Instead, that term as used 
in the Act should be interpreted by reference to Supreme Court jurisprudence.  
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“general rule” applies where the substantial burden: (1) is imposed in 
connection with a federally-funded activity; (2) affects interstate 
commerce; or (3) is imposed for the implementation or imposition of 
a land use regulation in the context of a scheme whereby government 
makes “individualized assessments” regarding the property in-
volved.47  RLUIPA also prohibits government from: (1) treating reli-
gious land uses on “less than equal terms” with a nonreligious land 
use;48 (2) “discriminat[ing] against” an assembly or institution on the 
basis of religion or religious denomination;49 (3) totally excluding re-
ligious assemblies;50 and (4) unreasonably limiting religious assem-
blies, institutions or structures.51 
The “general rule” applies to “the religious exercise of a person, 
including a religious assembly or institution,”52 while the other provi-
sions of the Act apply only to religious assemblies or institutions or, 
in the case of the “unreasonable limitation” provision,53 religious as-
semblies, institutions, or structures.  The Act does not define the 
terms “religious assembly” or “religious institution,” but their differ-
ing treatment—the ban on total exclusion applies only to “religious 
assemblies”—demonstrates that “religious assembly” is the broader 
term, reaching such religious exercises as group worship or study in 
private homes54 and congregations that occupy rented facilities.55 
RLUIPA’s potential reach is extremely broad due to its expansive 
definition of what constitutes a protected exercise of religion and 
 
Nothing in this Act, including the requirement in Section 5(g) that its terms be broad-
ly construed, is intended to change that principle.  The term ‘substantial burden’ as 
used in this Act is not intended to be given any broader interpretation than the Su-
preme Court’s articulation of the concept of substantial burden or religious exer-
cise.”). 
 47. See §§ 2000cc(a)(2)(A)–(C); Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 734 F. Supp. 2d 
409, 497–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing both Commerce Clause and individualized 
assessment jurisdictional elements). 
 48. § 2000cc(b)(1). 
 49. § 2000cc(b)(2). 
 50. See § 2000cc(b)(3)(A). 
 51. See § 2000cc(b)(3)(B). 
 52. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
 53. See § 2000cc(b)(3)(B). 
 54. See, e.g., Murphy v. Zoning Comm’n of New Milford, 223 F. Supp. 2d 377 (D. 
Conn. 2002) (denying town’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion); Murphy v. Zoning Comm’n of New Milford, 148 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D. Conn. 
2001) (issuing preliminary injunction invalidating limit on number of persons allowed 
to attend healing prayer services in private home). 
 55. See, e.g., Freedom Baptist Church of Del. Cnty. v. Twp. of Middletown, 204 F. 
Supp. 2d 857, 862 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
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which parties can claim protection.  The Act first defines “religious 
exercise” generally as “any exercise of religion, whether or not com-
pelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”56  It then defines 
a “Rule” that “[t]he use, building, or conversion of real property for 
the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be religious 
exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the proper-
ty for that purpose.”57  Reading these definitions together with the 
Act’s definition of “land use regulation” as a “zoning or landmarking 
law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claim-
ant’s use or development of land (including a structure affixed to 
land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servi-
tude, or other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or 
option to acquire such an interest,” shows that a wide range of inter-
ests in property that will be put to some use for “religious exercise” 
can support a RLUIPA claim.58 
Other major provisions in RLUIPA: (1) prescribe rules for legal 
claims brought under the statute,59 including shifting the burden of 
persuasion to local governments once a plaintiff produces prima facie 
evidence of a violation;60 (2) specifically authorize accommodations 
by local government to avoid RLUIPA liability;61 (3) state that any 
such accommodations are not themselves a violation of RLUIPA so 
long as the accommodations are permissible under the Establishment 
 
 56. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). 
 57. § 2000cc-5(7)(B). 
 58. § 2000cc-5(5).  This definition has led courts to reject claims that RLUIPA 
applies to such governmental actions as: (1) annexation, see Vision Church, United 
Methodist v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 998 (7th Cir. 2007); (2) a sewer tap-in 
ordinance, see Second Baptist Church of Leechburg v. Gilpin Twp., 118 F. App’x 615, 
617 (3d Cir. 2004); and (3) eminent domain, see St. John’s United Church of Christ v. 
City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2007); Faith Temple Church v. Town of 
Brighton, 402 F. Supp. 2d 250, 256–58 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). But see Cottonwood Chris-
tian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1222 (C.D. Cal. 2002) 
(finding jurisdiction under RLUIPA for use of eminent domain that was premised on 
an underlying zoning scheme).  One scholar has argued that courts should allow 
RLUIPA claims for restrictions imposed by building codes and aesthetic regulations 
when these involve individual assessments. See generally Shelly Ross Saxer, As-
sessing RLUIPA’s Application to Building Codes and Aesthetic Land Use Regula-
tion, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 623 (2009).   
 59. See § 2000cc-2. 
 60. See § 2000cc-2(b). 
 61. See § 2000cc-3(e). 
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Clause;62 and (4) provide for the recovery of attorneys’ fees under 42 
U.S.C. § 1988.63 
B. Constitutionality 
RLUIPA has been held constitutional in the land use context in 
numerous federal district court cases,64
 
and several federal court of 
appeals cases.65  In 2003, a federal district court in California declared 
RLUIPA to be unconstitutional,
 
but in 2006 that ruling was reversed 
and the case remanded by the Ninth Circuit66 in light of the Court of 
Appeals’ previously holding that RLUIPA was constitutional.67 
C. RLUIPA Litigation 
Most RLUIPA litigation has involved claims that a land use regula-
tion has imposed a substantial burden on religious exercise and/or 
constitutes unequal treatment of a religious use as compared to a sim-
ilarly situated secular use.  Only a handful of RLUIPA cases have 
been decided on claims involving discriminatory treatment, total ex-
clusion, or unreasonable limitation.68 
 
 62. See § 2000cc-4. 
 63. See § 1988(b) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of . . . the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 . . . the court, in its dis-
cretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”). See generally Alden, supra note 13, at 1810–11. 
 64. See, e.g., Lighthouse Cmty. Church of God v. City of Southfield, No. 05-
40220, 2007 WL 30280 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 3, 2007); Church of Hills of Bedminster v. 
Twp. of Bedminster, No. Civ. 05-3332(SRC), 2006 WL 462674 (D.N.J. Feb. 24, 2006); 
Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, No. SA–01–CA–1149–RF, 
2004 WL 546792 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2004); U.S. v. Maui Cnty., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1010 
(D. Haw. 2003); Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 
2d 1140 (E.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006); Murphy v. Zoning 
Comm’n of New Milford, 289 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D. Conn. 2003), judgment vacated on 
other grounds, 402 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2005); Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mama-
roneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), judgment vacated on other grounds, 386 
F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2004); Freedom Baptist Church of Del. Cnty. v. Twp. of Mid-
dletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
 65. See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 
2007); Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City, 456 F.3d 978; Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. 
Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 66. See Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 
1097–1104 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that RLUIPA was unconstitutional because 
both the “individualized assessments” and Commerce Clause jurisdictional prongs 
were suspect), rev’d, 197 F. App’x 718 (9th Cir. 2006).   
 67. See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City, 456 F.3d at 994–95. 
 68. See BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 3, §§ 7.29–7:34 (discussing numerous 
cases involving substantial burden and equal treatment claims, but only a small num-
ber of cases involving discrimination, exclusion, and unreasonable limitation claims). 
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The courts of appeals have adopted varying approaches to both 
substantial burden69 and unequal treatment70 claims.  As regards sub-
stantial burden, the circuits have sought to fit existing substantial 
burden tests into terms that can be more readily applied to the land 
use context.71  I argue below that, regardless of the test applied, sub-
stantial burden claims have not fared particularly well absent some 
indication that the government applied its land use regulations in a 
less than fair and carefully-reasoned manner.  Absent those factors, 
courts have had little trouble rejecting claims that even significant re-
strictions imposed by land use decisions constituted a substantial bur-
den on religious exercise.  Examples of this include: upholding a ban 
on churches in a village’s industrial zone72 and a town’s business dis-
trict,73 not allowing a church to build a house of worship of the size it 
 
 69. See id. §§ 7.29–7:31. 
 70. See id. § 7:32; Anthony Lazzaro Minervini, Freedom From Religion: 
RLUIPA, Religious Freedom, and Representative Democracy on Trial, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 571, 584–90 (2010) (noting confusion in application of RLUIPA’s equal terms 
provision). See generally Terry M. Crist, III, Equally Confused: Construing 
RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1139 (2009); Matthias 
Kleinsasser, RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision and the Split Between the Eleventh 
and Third Circuits, 29 REV. LITIG. 163 (2009). 
 71. See generally Salkin & Lavine, supra note 14, app. (listing substantial burden 
tests by jurisdiction). Compare San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 
F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[F]or a land use regulation to impose a ‘substantial 
burden,’ it must be ‘oppressive’ to a ‘significantly great’ extent. That is, a ‘substantial 
burden’ on ‘religious exercise’ must impose a significantly great restriction or onus 
upon such exercise.”) and Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 
1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A] ‘substantial burden’ is akin to significant pressure which 
directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly. 
Thus, a substantial burden can result from pressure that tends to force adherents to 
forego religious precepts or from pressure that mandates religious conduct.”), with 
Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“We therefore hold that, in the context of RLUIPA’s broad definition of religious 
exercise, a land-use regulation that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise 
is one that necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for ren-
dering religious exercise—including the use of real property for the purpose thereof 
within the regulated jurisdiction generally—effectively impracticable. . . . [S]carcity 
of affordable land . . . along with the costs, procedural requirements, and inherent 
political aspects of the Special Use, Map Amendment, and Planned Development 
approval processes . . . are incidental to any high-density urban land use [and thus] do 
not amount to a substantial burden on religious exercise.”). 
 72. See Petra Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 851 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (noting that where a church is denied the right to build in a particular zon-
ing district, but there are ample sites available elsewhere for churches to build a new 
church or convert an existing structure to use as a church, there is no substantial bur-
den). 
 73. See Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1228 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that exclud-
ing a synagogue from a business district was not a substantial burden even though the 
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desired,74 requiring a church to face significant difficulty in locating an 
appropriate site for a new house of worship in an urban area,75 and 
upholding a restriction on signage a church claimed was needed for its 
ministry.76 
“Less than equal terms” claims77 have also seen courts formulate 
different approaches to the question of how to determine what is a 
“similarly-situated” comparator to the religious use claimed to have 
been treated unequally.  In 2004, the Eleventh Circuit, in Midrash Se-
phardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, became the first court to adopt an 
explicit test for an equal-terms challenge,78 
 
interpreting the language 
of RLUIPA’s equal terms provision literally: “Under RLUIPA, we 
must first evaluate whether an entity qualifies as an ‘assembly or insti-
tution,’ as that term is used in RLUIPA, before considering whether 
the governmental authority treats a religious assembly or institution 
differently than a nonreligious assembly or institution.”79  Because 
RLUIPA does not define “assembly” or “institution,” the Midrash 
Sephardi court used dictionary definitions for those terms and ruled 
 
exclusion required that some congregants walk farther to attend services). Note, 
however, that this restriction was found to violate the equal terms provision of 
RLUIPA. See id. at 1231; see also New Life Ministries v. Charter Twp. of Mt. Morris, 
No. 05-74339, 2006 WL 2583254, at *5 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (finding equal terms viola-
tion where numerous nonreligious assemblies and institutions were permitted in C-2 
district, but religious institutions were prohibited). 
 74. See Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1000 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that restrictions on size, activities and hours of operation, while inconven-
ient, did not constitute a substantial burden where the church was allowed to con-
struct a facility on the property it currently owned that would be of sufficient size to 
accommodate the immediate and future needs of the congregation, even though it 
was not the size preferred by the church). 
 75. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 761. 
 76. See Trinity Assembly of God of Balt. City, Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Balt., 
962 A.2d 404, 430 (Md. 2008) (holding that denial of a variance that would allow a 
large changeable message sign was not a substantial burden). 
 77. Courts have ruled that a less than equal terms claimant need not prove that 
the unequal treatment imposes a substantial burden. See, e.g., Lighthouse Inst. for 
Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 283 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 2007); 
Konikov v. Orange Cnty., Fla., 410 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); 
Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1229–35; Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d 
at 762.  
 78. See 366 F.3d at 1230. The Eleventh Circuit is unique, however, in reading the 
“strict scrutiny” provisions from the substantial burden subsection into the separate 
equal terms subsection. See id. at 1232; see also Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas 
Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 651 F.3d 1163, 1171 n.37 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We recognize that 
the Eleventh Circuit does read the ‘strict scrutiny’ provisions from the substantial 
burden subsection into the separate equal terms subsection, but we do not agree.”). 
 79. Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1230. 
WEINSTEIN_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  9:29 AM 
1236 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
that because the challenged ordinance allowed a non-religious assem-
bly (a private club) in the zoning district in question, it must permit a 
religious assembly to locate there as well.80  In contrast, three years 
later, the Third Circuit ruled that, “a regulation will violate the Equal 
Terms provision only if it treats religious assemblies or institutions 
less well than secular assemblies or institutions that are similarly situ-
ated as to the regulatory purpose.”81 
More recently, the Seventh Circuit, in 2010, in an en banc majority 
opinion authored by Judge Richard Posner, provided both an over-
view of the question and a new test for equal-terms challenges, plus 
critiques of that new test in concurring and dissenting opinions.82  In 
Judge Posner’s view, the Eleventh Circuit approach, if “[p]ressed too 
hard, . . . would give religious land uses favored treatment[.]”83  The 
Third Circuit test, in his view, also fails to understand the equal-terms 
provision properly because the court’s  
use of ‘regulatory purpose’ as a guide to interpretation invites specu-
lation concerning the reason behind exclusion of churches; invites 
self-serving testimony by zoning officials and hired expert witnesses; 
facilitates zoning classifications thinly disguised as neutral but actu-
ally systematically unfavorable to churches (as by favoring public 
reading rooms over other forms of nonprofit assembly); and makes 
 
 80. See id. at 1230–31; see also Konikov, 410 F.3d at 1324–29; Primera Iglesia 
Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1308–10 (11th 
Cir. 2006).  The Midrash Sephardi ruling was summarized in River of Life Kingdom 
Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, Ill., 611 F.3d 367, 369 (7th Cir. 2010), as:  
The Eleventh Circuit reads the language of the equal-terms provision liter-
ally: a zoning ordinance that permits any ‘assembly,’ as defined by dictionar-
ies, to locate in a district must permit a church to locate there as well even if 
the only secular assemblies permitted are hospital operating theaters, bus 
terminals, air raid shelters, restaurants that have private dining rooms in 
which a book club or professional association might meet, and sports stadi-
ums. 
 81. Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d at 266 (emphasis in origi-
nal). This approach was described by Judge Posner in River of Life Kingdom Minis-
tries, 611 F.3d at 368: “The Court must identify first the goals of the challenged zon-
ing ordinance and second the secular assemblies (meeting places) that are 
comparable to the plaintiff’s religious assembly in the sense of having roughly the 
same relation to those goals.” 
 82. See River of Life Kingdom Ministries, 611 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2010); see also 
BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 763–67. 
 83. River of Life Kingdom Ministries, 611 F.3d at 369.  Judge Posner argues that 
under the Eleventh Circuit’s test, that court sees a “seemingly unequal treatment of 
religious uses that nevertheless is consistent with the ‘strict scrutiny’ standard for de-
termining the propriety of a regulation affecting religion” as not violating the equal-
terms provision. Id. (citing Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1232). 
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the meaning of ‘equal terms’ in a federal statute depend on the in-
tentions of local government officials.84   
In Posner’s view, these problems “can be solved by a shift of focus 
from regulatory purpose to accepted zoning criteria,” arguing that 
‘‘‘[p]urpose’ is subjective and manipulable, so asking about ‘regulato-
ry purpose’ might result in giving local officials a free hand in answer-
ing the question ‘equal with respect to what?’,’’ while ‘‘‘[r]egulatory 
criteria’ are objective—and it is federal judges who will apply the cri-
teria to resolve the issue.”85 
A subsequent Second Circuit case, while acknowledging the split 
among the Circuits, shifted its focus from the “formal” differences be-
tween the religious and secular uses that were being compared—here, 
catering services at a church versus catering services at two hotels—to 
the question of “whether, in practical terms, secular and religious in-
stitutions are treated equally.”86  Applying that practical standard, the 
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s finding that the city had vio-
lated RLUIPA’s equal terms provision when it sought to prohibit the 
catering services at the church.87 
 
 84. Id. at 371. 
 85. Id.  Applying that test to the case at hand, where the action challenged was 
the exclusion of a church—along with other new noncommercial uses—from an area 
close to the town’s train station designated for revitalization as a commercial center, 
Judge Posner found that the designation of exclusively commercial districts was an 
accepted zoning criterion, noting that the village “really was applying conventional 
criteria for commercial zoning in banning noncommercial land uses from a part of the 
village suitable for a commercial district because of proximity to the train station.” Id. 
at 373–74.  Other judges on the en banc panel took issue, however, with Judge Pos-
ner’s view.  Five judges, who concurred with the majority’s ruling that there was no 
violation of the equal-terms provision, viewed the Third Circuit’s “regulatory pur-
pose” test as “equally valid,” id. at 374,
 
or “the most appropriate,”
 
 id. at 376, and ar-
gued, variously, that “the ‘accepted regulatory criteria test’ . . . presents a risk of self-
serving testimony just as the majority believes the ‘regulatory purpose’ approach 
would,” id. at 376–77,
  
or that “the search by the different circuits for an entirely ob-
jective test is probably in vain.”
 
Id. at 374–75.
  
The one dissenting judge argued at 
length that the Eleventh Circuit’s test was most appropriate and would have found a 
violation under that test. Id. at 389–92. 
 86. Third Church of Christ, Scientist, of New York City v. City of New York, 626 
F.3d 667, 671 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 87. See id. at 672–73; see also Elijah Group, Inc. v. City of Leon Valley, Tex., 643 
F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the “less than equal terms” provision 
requires a religious use to show more than simply that its religious use is forbidden 
and some other nonreligious use is permitted, but rather, “must be measured by the 
ordinance itself and the criteria by which it treats institutions differently”).  In this 
case, the Fifth Circuit specifically noted, “[t]his analysis should not be interpreted as 
necessarily adopting any of the [less than equal terms] tests heretofore adopted by 
the other circuits.” Id. at 424 n.19. 
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D. Role of the Beckett Fund and the U.S. Justice Department in 
RLUIPA Litigation 
The Beckett Fund for Religious Liberty, which describes itself as a 
“non-profit, public-interest legal and educational institute that pro-
tects the free expression of all faiths,”88 has provided significant litiga-
tion support for RLUIPA claimants.89  Additionally, the U.S. Justice 
Department (DOJ) has played a significant role in the enforcement of 
RLUIPA.  A DOJ Report issued in September 2010 states: “The De-
partment of Justice has used the full array of available enforcement 
tools to ensure the protection of religious freedom.”90  The Report 
notes that since the enactment of RLUIPA, the DOJ has opened fif-
ty-one RLUIPA investigations; filed seven RLUIPA lawsuits involv-
ing land use; filed ten amicus briefs in private cases to inform the 
court about its interpretation of the law’s provisions; and intervened 
in private lawsuits to defend the constitutionality of RLUIPA in thir-
ty land use cases.91  The DOJ continues to remain active in RLUIPA 
enforcement.92 
The active role of both the Fund and the DOJ in RLUIPA litiga-
tion, when combined with the availability of attorneys’ fees for a suc-
cessful claim, certainly poses concerns for a local government when 
 
 88. See Our Mission, BECKETT FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becket 
fund.org/our-mission/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
 89. See Our Cases, BECKETT FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becket 
fund.org /u-s-litigation/our-cases/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).  The Fund’s website 
lists the following RLUIPA cases in which it is, or has been, involved: Elijah Group, 
Inc., 643 F.3d 419; Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs of 
Boulder Cnty., 612 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (D. Colo. 2009), aff’d, 613 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 
2010); Yoder v. Town of Morristown, 7:09-cv-00007-TJM-GHL (N.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 
6, 2009); Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Comm’n, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. 
Haw. 2002); Cambodian Buddhist Soc. of Conn., Inc. v. Planning and Zoning Com’n 
of Town of Newtown, 941 A.2d 868 (Conn. 2008). 
 90. REPORT, supra note 27, at 5. 
 91. See id. at 5–6. 
 92. The DOJ filed amicus curiae briefs in two additional cases in 2011: Elijah 
Group, Inc., 643 F.3d 419, and Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of New 
York, 650 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Bronx Household of Faith v. 
New York City Bd. Of Educ., 132 S. Ct. 816 (2011).  The DOJ also announced set-
tlements of a number of RLUIPA claims in 2011, including those against Henrico 
County, VA and Lilburn, Georgia. See Justice Department Resolves Lawsuit Alleg-
ing Religious Discrimination by Henrico County, Va., Against Muslim Group, DEP’T 
JUST. (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/September/11-crt-1139.html; 
Press Release, US Dep’t of Justice, Settlement Reached with Lilburn, Georgia, Over 
Religious Discrimination Case Involving Muslim Group (Aug. 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/gan/press/2011/08-26-11.html. See generally Religious 
Freedom in Focus Newsletters, US DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/spec 
_topics/religiousdiscrimination/newsletters.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
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threatened with a RLUIPA claim.  Local officials have good reason 
to believe that they may come under investigation by the DOJ and 
face the likelihood that a RLUIPA plaintiff will be able to find repre-
sentation from local counsel, possibly with expert assistance from the 
Becket Fund. 
II.  THE EFFECT OF RLUIPA ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
A. What We Do Know—and What We Don’t—About RLUIPA 
Litigation 
1. Amount of Litigation 
As previously noted, significantly more claims were brought under 
RLUIPA during its first four years than had been brought during the 
four years RFRA claims were available against state and local gov-
ernments.93  Despite that, I would argue that we can now see that 
there has been a relatively modest amount of RLUIPA litigation—
fewer than 250 cases94—when one considers that: (1) RLUIPA has 
been in effect for over eleven years; (2) there are approximately 
39,000 general purpose governments in the United States that are po-
tential defendants,95 the vast majority of which engage in some form 
of land use regulation;96 and (3) as described previously, RLUIPA 
covers a broad range of potential claims and possible plaintiffs.97 
The amount of RLUIPA litigation also appears quite modest when 
compared to other types of litigation involving land uses with some 
degree of protection under the First Amendment, such as adult enter-
tainment or billboards.  Thus, for example, my search of Westlaw 
produced approximately twice as many cases involving challenges to 
land use regulation of adult entertainment businesses98 and more than 
three times as many cases involving challenges to land use regulation 
 
 93. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 94. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 95. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU ET AL., GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION: 2002 CEN-
SUS OF GOVERNMENTS 5 tbl.4 (Dec. 2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2003pubs/gc021x1.pdf (showing 3034 county governments and 35,933 sub-county 
general purpose governments). 
 96. See, e.g., ERIC D. KELLY & PATRICK J. ROHAN, 5 ZONING AND LAND USE 
CONTROLS § 33.01 n.3 (2011) (“The local zoning ordinance . . . is the mainstay of land 
use control in the United States . . . .”). 
 97. See supra Part I.A. 
 98. Author’s Westlaw search of ALLCASES database conducted February 9, 
2012 using search term: “ADULT BUSINESS” “ADULT ENTERTAINMENT” /P 
ZON! & da(aft 9/2000 & bef 2/9/2012). 
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of billboards and other forms of outdoor advertising99 during the 
same eleven plus year period that RLUIPA has been in effect. 
What we do not know is the extent to which the threat of potential 
RLUIPA litigation has caused local governments to take action they 
might not otherwise have taken.  Arguably, such actions would range 
from those that are wholly “appropriate,” in the sense that a land use 
regulation which clearly violated RLUIPA was brought into con-
formance with the statute,100 to actions that are wholly “inappropri-
ate,” in the sense that a local government acceded to a demand from 
a potential RLUIPA claimant that is clearly unjustified.101  Although 
some have claimed that RLUIPA has seriously compromised the abil-
ity of local governments to administer local land use regulations in a 
manner that fairly balances the needs of both religious and secular in-
terests,102 those claims are not supported by any empirical data. 
2. Outcomes of RLUIPA Litigation 
We also know that the results of RLUIPA litigation have been de-
cidedly mixed since RLUIPA’s early years103 and remain so.104  This is 
not surprising.  Numerous scholars and commentators have be-
moaned the indeterminate nature of RLUIPA litigation, particularly 
cases claiming that a land use regulation has imposed a substantial 
burden on religious exercise or violated the statute’s equal terms pro-
 
 99. Author’s Westlaw search of ALLCASES database conducted February 9, 
2012 using search term: BILLBOARD “OUTDOOR ADVERTISING” “OFF-
PREMISE SIGN” “OFF-SITE-SIGN” /P ZON! & da(aft 9/2000 & bef 2/9/2012). 
 100. For example, “appropriate” actions would be similar to the settlements 
reached with the DOJ. See supra note 17. 
 101. One example is a claim that a religious institution does not have to comply 
with the normal permit approval process—a claim that has been uniformly rejected 
by the courts. See, e.g., Konikov v. Orange Cnty., Fla., 410 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 
2005) (stating that “requiring applications for variances, special permits, or other re-
lief provisions would not offend RLUIPA’s goals”). 
 102. See, e.g., Daniel Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone: The Overbroad Applica-
tions and Troubling Implications of RLUIPA’s Land Use Provisions, 29 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 805, 806 (2006) (arguing that the trend in RLUIPA decisions is towards mak-
ing religious institutions immune from zoning laws); Salkin & Lavine, supra note 14, 
at 255 (“RLUIPA has had a chilling effect on local government’s ability to exercise 
the police power through zoning to ensure that community character is preserved and 
that the public health, safety, and welfare is protected.”). 
 103. See Alden, supra note 13, at 1787 n.34. 
 104. See, e.g., Michael S. Giaimo, RLUIPA in the Courts, in RLUIPA READER: 
RELIGIOUS LAND USES, ZONING AND THE COURTS 87–111 (Michael S. Giaimo & Lo-
ra A. Lucero eds., 2009) (discussing numerous RLUIPA decisions and showing that 
claimants have had both successes and failures). 
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vision.105  Obviously, this lack of certainty as to the likely outcome of 
potential litigation is a concern as a factor that can lead to litigation. 
One aspect of the outcomes of RLUIPA litigation is of particular 
note: the award of, or a settlement providing for, very substantial 
damages and attorney fees in egregious cases.  Three cases stand out: 
(1) Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck,106 in which 
the court awarded $4.75 million in damages; (2) Reaching Hearts In-
ternational, Inc. v. Prince George’s County,107 in which the court 
made a conditional award of damages in excess of $3.7 million, and 
(3) Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 
Florida,108 in which, after losing a RLUIPA challenge, city officials 
agreed to a settlement that included paying $2 million to the 
RLUIPA plaintiff and having city officials attend religious sensitivity 
training.109  As I will discuss below, cases such as these, involving de-
nials of land use approvals shown to be based on religious prejudice, 
while relatively rare, argue that RLUIPA is a necessary safeguard of 
religious freedom. 
 
 105. See, e.g., Lennington, supra note 102, at 814 (arguing that “the question of 
what constitutes a ‘substantial burden’ is far from clear, and has led to confusion and 
a split among the courts”); Adam J. McLeod, Resurrecting the Bogeyman: The Curi-
ous Forms of the Substantial Burden Test in RLUIPA, 40 REAL EST. L.J. 115, 118–
49, 166–75 (2011) (noting confusion in application of the substantial burden test and 
suggesting a solution by focusing on land use decisions involving subjective individual 
assessments); Salkin & Lavine, supra note 14, at 219 (arguing that inconsistent appli-
cation of RLUIPA “has created confusion among municipalities, planners and the 
bar; and has failed to date to create one national standard or rule with respect to the 
siting of religious land uses”); see also Minervini, supra note 70, at 584–95 (noting 
confusion in application of RLUIPA’s equal terms provision). 
 106. 504 F.3d 338, 352 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting the “arbitrary blindness to the facts” 
exhibited by village officials). 
 107. 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 781–82 (D. Md. 2008), aff’d, 368 Fed. App’x 370 (4th Cir. 
2010) (upholding jury’s finding that county defendants’ actions were motivated, at 
least in part, on the basis of religious discrimination). 
 108. 436 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (finding that “[n]othing in the or-
dinance or its application prevents City officials from encouraging some places of 
worship while discouraging others through the arbitrary grant or denial of a Special 
Exception”). 
 109. See Todd Wright, Hollywood to Pay $2 Million to Synagogue, MIAMI HER-
ALD, June 26, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 11054024.  The author was retained as 
an expert witness by the DOJ in its lawsuit against the City of Hollywood, which was 
settled at the same time the city settled with the synagogue plaintiff. See Press Re-
lease, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Resolves Lawsuit Alleging Religious 
Discrimination by City of Hollywood, Florida (July 5, 2006), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/July/05_crt_416.html. 
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B. How RLUIPA Has Changed Local Land Use Regulation 
RLUIPA has made land use regulation more difficult for local 
governments in what I would term both “negative” and “positive” 
ways.  On the “negative” side, RLUIPA has led to litigation, or 
threats of litigation, that lack substantial merit110 and likely would not 
have been brought were RLUIPA not available.111  Responding to ac-
tual or threatened litigation not only imposes legal and other costs 
(e.g., diversion of staff time) on local governments, but may well have 
led some local governments to grant land use approvals to religious 
uses in cases where the approval should properly have been denied.112 
On the “positive” side, RLUIPA effectively allows for heightened 
scrutiny—including strict scrutiny—of local land use decisions that 
would not necessarily have triggered heightened scrutiny absent 
RLUIPA.  This has led, in a number of cases, to courts uncovering 
discrimination against religious groups.113  I used the term “effectively 
allows,” rather than “effectively imposes,” because courts have used 
several “gate-keeping” mechanisms to limit an overly expansive ap-
plication of RLUIPA,114 including: demanding tests for what consti-
tutes a substantial burden on religion,115 avoiding expansive readings 
 
 110. See, e.g., supra note 101 (discussing the claim that a religious institution need 
not make application for a land use approval).  
 111. For example, without RLUIPA, a claim that a land use regulation imposed a 
“substantial burden” on religious exercise would be subjected only to rational basis 
review under Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), unless the claimant 
could demonstrate that the claim involved a facially neutral law that targeted reli-
gious uses so as to bring the case under Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). See discussion at note 8, supra.  It is logical to 
assume that fewer claims will be made when the standard of review is rational basis 
rather than strict scrutiny. 
 112. This argument has been made by numerous critics of RLUIPA. See supra text 
accompanying note 102. 
 113. See supra text accompanying notes 106–09. But see Marci A. Hamilton, Let-
ter to the United States Senate (July 24, 2000) (on file with author) (claiming that af-
ter reviewing the record presented to Congress, she was unable to identify a single 
case or anecdote where a government acted in a discriminatory manner that could 
not be justified by “a neutral reading of the local government’s purpose”).  
 114. See, e.g., Alden, supra note 13, at 1779 (arguing that “courts have avoided the 
application of strict scrutiny and have made it very challenging for religious entities 
to show that secular land users have been treated more favorably”).  Note, however, 
that the statute states that it must be construed broadly to protect religious exercise 
“to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitu-
tion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2006); see also Reaching Hearts Int’l., Inc. v. Prince 
George’s Cnty., 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 785 n.13 (D. Md. 2008), judgment aff’d, 368 Fed. 
Appx. 370 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting the “broad application” of RLUIPA). 
 115. See supra notes 71–76. 
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of what constitutes religious exercise116 or land use regulation,117 and 
requiring closely-matched comparators for equal terms challenges.118 
Thus, in my view, the courts have, overall, been effective in apply-
ing RLUIPA.  An example that shows why I hold this view is the way 
the Seventh Circuit has dealt with RLUIPA claims.  In Civil Liberties 
for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, the plaintiffs had originally 
sued under RFRA, claiming that the city’s zoning facially discrimi-
nated against churches because it required them to obtain special use 
approvals to locate in zoning districts where nonreligious assembly 
uses were permitted as of right.119  The RFRA claims were dropped 
after Boerne.120  The city recognized the validity of the plaintiffs’ con-
stitutional claims, however, and in February 2001 amended its zoning 
ordinance to require that all assembly uses in the zoning districts in 
question obtain special use approvals and exempted churches from 
having to show that their proposed use was “necessary for the public 
convenience.”121  Despite this accommodation, the plaintiffs subse-
quently amended their complaint to include claims pursuant to 
RLUIPA, but the district court granted the city’s motion for summary 
judgment, ruling that the February 2000 zoning ordinance amend-
ments had removed any potential RLUIPA violation.122 
On appeal, the churches claimed that RLUIPA’s broad definition 
of “religious exercise” meant that there was a “substantial burden” on 
religion whenever a land use regulation “inhibits or constrains the 
use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of reli-
gious exercise.”  The Seventh Circuit rejected the claim, arguing that 
this construction of RLUIPA’s “substantial burden on religious exer-
cise” language “would render meaningless the word ‘substantial,’ be-
 
 116. See, e.g., Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 235 F. Supp. 
2d 1186 (D. Wyo. 2002) (ruling against church’s claim that day care center constitutes 
religious exercise under RLUIPA), aff’d, 427 F.3d 775 (10th Cir. 2005), opinion va-
cated on reh’g, 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006); Greater Bible Way Temple of Jackson 
v. City of Jackson, 733 N.W.2d 734 (Mich. 2007) (ruling against church’s claim that 
building an apartment complex constitutes religious exercise under RLUIPA); Glen-
side Ctr., Inc. v. Abington Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 973 A.2d 10 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2009) (finding that Alcoholics Anonymous meetings are not a religious use under 
RLUIPA). 
 117. See supra note 58. 
 118. See supra notes 77–87 (indicating that other Circuits have rejected the Elev-
enth Circuit’s literal approach).  
 119. 342 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 120. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 121. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 758. 
 122. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 157 F. Supp. 2d 903, 917 
(N.D. Ill. 2001), motion to amend denied, 2002 WL 485380 (N.D. Ill. March 29, 2002). 
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cause the slightest obstacle to religious exercise incidental to the regu-
lation of land use, however minor the burden it were to impose, could 
then constitute a burden sufficient to trigger RLUIPA’s [strict scruti-
ny] requirement . . . .”123 
These plaintiffs had claimed that “the scarcity of affordable land 
available for development” in certain zones, “along with the costs, 
procedural requirements, and inherent political aspects” of the special 
use and other zoning procedures, imposed a substantial burden.124  
The court rejected this facial challenge.  Noting that such conditions 
“are incidental to any high-density urban land use,” and thus “may 
contribute to the ordinary difficulties associated with location (by any 
person or entity, religious or nonreligious) in a large city,” the court 
found that “they do not render impracticable the use of real property 
in Chicago for religious exercise, much less discourage churches from 
locating or attempting to locate in Chicago,” observing that each of 
the plaintiffs had been successful in finding a location.125  The court 
argued that were it to find a RLUIPA violation based on the time and 
expense required to meet land use permit requirements, then 
“RLUIPA would require municipal governments not merely to treat 
religious land uses on an equal footing with nonreligious land uses, 
but rather to favor them in the form of an outright exemption from 
land use regulations.”126  The court sternly rejected any claim that 
RLUIPA mandates such favoritism: “Unfortunately for Appellants, 
no such free pass for religious land uses masquerades among the legit-
imate protections RLUIPA affords to religious exercise.”127 
 
 123. Id. at 761 (holding that, under RLUIPA, a land use regulation should be 
viewed as imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise only if it “necessarily 
bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise-
including the use of real property for the purpose thereof within the regulated juris-
diction generally-effectively impracticable.”). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 761–62. 
 127. Id. at 762. The court also rejected plaintiffs’ claims that the special use re-
quirement violated RLUIPA’s nondiscrimination provisions, the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment, or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; however, Judge Posner dissented on the Equal Protection claim.  Two 
of the panel’s three judges rejected the claim that equal protection challenges to land 
use regulation of churches should be subject to heightened scrutiny because such 
regulation “necessarily implicates the fundamental right of religious exercise,” citing 
the Supreme Court’s well-known decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), as authority. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 
F.3d at 766.  Applying rational basis review, the majority held that Chicago had not 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 766–
67. Judge Posner’s dissent argued that in Cleburne, the Supreme Court expanded the 
WEINSTEIN_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  9:29 AM 
2012] EFFECT OF RLUIPA 1245 
Two years later, the Seventh Circuit revisited its interpretation of 
the substantial burden test in Saints Constantine & Helen Greek Or-
thodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin.128  Here, the church ac-
quired property in a residential zone and applied to rezone part of the 
property from residential to institutional in order to build a new 
house of worship.  To address the city’s concern that some other use 
might be developed on the rezoned parcel if the church decided not 
to build on the site, the church modified its application by agreeing 
that the city would promulgate a planned unit development ordinance 
limiting the parcel to church-related uses as a condition of the rezon-
ing.129  The city council, however, still denied the rezoning, citing var-
ious legal concerns and proposing alternatives.130 
After that denial, the court noted,  
the Church could have searched around for other parcels of land 
(though a lot more effort would have been involved in such a search 
than, as the City would have it, calling up some real estate agents), 
or it could have continued filing applications with the City, but in ei-
ther case there would have been delay, uncertainty, and expense.131   
Since the court found the church willing to bind itself by any means 
necessary not to sell the land for a nonreligious institutional use, a 
factor that would eliminate the city’s only legitimate concern, the 
court concluded that the church was substantially burdened by the 
city’s denial and the “delay, uncertainty, and expense” it imposed.132 
 
boundaries of rational basis review by using, and thus authorizing future use of, a 
“sliding scale” approach to rational basis review so that “discrimination against sensi-
tive uses is to be given more careful, realistic, skeptical scrutiny by the courts than 
discrimination against purely commercial activities.” Id. at 769.  Viewing the churches 
in this case as “no less sensitive a land use than homes for the mentally retarded” in 
Cleburne, Judge Posner argued, “[w]hen government singles out churches for special 
regulation, as it does in the Chicago ordinance, the risk of discrimination, not against 
religion as such—Chicago is not dominated by atheists—but against particular sects, 
is great enough to require more careful judicial scrutiny than in the ordinary equal 
protection challenge to zoning.” Id. at 770.  Applying this standard, Posner argued 
that the challenged zoning provisions discriminated against “new, small, or impecuni-
ous churches” by making it more difficult and expensive to find locations they can 
afford, and he found no justification for such discrimination in the land use goals ar-
ticulated by the city. Id. at 770–73. 
 128. 396 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 129. See id. at 898. 
 130. See id. at 898–99. 
 131. Id. at 901.  
 132. See id.  For further discussion of the various Courts of Appeals’ treatment of 
the substantial burden issue, see BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 3, § 7:29; see 
also Salkin & Lavine, supra note 14, app. (listing substantial burden tests by jurisdic-
tion). 
WEINSTEIN_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  9:29 AM 
1246 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
These two Seventh Circuit opinions illustrate what I believe is the 
courts’ pragmatic approach to finding a way to maneuver in the diffi-
cult terrain that RLUIPA occupies; aptly described by the Second 
Circuit as  
a treacherous narrow zone between the [f]ree [e]xercise [c]lause, 
which seeks to assure that government does not interfere with the 
exercise of religion, and the [e]stablishment [c]lause, which prohibits 
the government from becoming entwined with religion in a manner 
that would express preference for one religion over another, or reli-
gion over irreligion.133   
In particular, they illustrate a court’s looking far more carefully at an 
“as applied” RLUIPA challenge than a facial challenge, a difference 
in approach that I consider well-taken and which other scholars have 
advocated.134  It is an approach that combines appropriate judicial 
deference to a legislature that enacts a neutral law of general applica-
bility with the heightened judicial scrutiny that becomes appropriate 
when that same law is applied to a specific zoning approval,135 a cir-
cumstance that frequently allows for subjectivity, and thus the poten-
tial for discrimination or arbitrariness in the approval process.136  Alt-
hough this approach is a reasonable compromise between courts’ 
being either too deferential or not deferential enough, it has been and 
will continue to be applied differently by different courts, as previous-
ly noted in discussions of the substantial burden137 and “less than 
equal terms”138 provisions of the statute.  Obviously, this is not a situ-
ation unique to RLUIPA litigation.139 
 
 133. Westchester Day School v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
 134. See, e.g., Ostrow supra note 37, at 734. 
 135. As has been noted by others, this approach to judicial review of local land use 
regulation has been in place since the Supreme Court first reviewed the constitution-
ality of zoning. Id. at 753. Compare Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 
(1926) (upholding constitutionality of zoning against a facial challenge) with Nectow 
v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (finding that a zoning ordinance as applied 
violated substantive due process). 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 106–09; see also Ostrow, supra note 37, at 
723–24. 
 137. See discussion at notes 71–76, supra. 
 138. See discussion at notes 77–87, supra. 
 139. For example, the author’s search of WESTLAW’s jlr (Journals and Law Re-
views) database on February 20, 2012 using the search term “ti(“circuit split”) & 
da(aft 2006)” shows that eighty-six articles with the term “Circuit Split” in the title 
have been published in the past five years. 
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CONCLUSION 
RLUIPA reflects today’s dynamic social, political, and legal envi-
ronment regarding the role of religion in our society in the context of 
potential conflicts between religious uses (either institutions or indi-
viduals exercising their rights to religious freedom) and local land use 
regulations. With RLUIPA, Congress has attempted to empower re-
ligious uses when they choose where and how they build a sanctuary 
or assemble for worship, and to restrain local governments when they 
seek to apply zoning or landmark regulations to those uses in ways 
that violate religious freedom. 
There are some things we know about how RLUIPA has affected 
local governments. RLUIPA has produced a relatively modest 
amount of litigation, in my view, with the results decidedly mixed. 
Many local governments have successfully defended their land use 
regulations against a RLUIPA claim. At the same time, others have 
lost spectacularly, with several cases producing multi-million dollar 
awards or settlements. 
But there is also much we do not know.  In general terms, to what 
extent have local governments “caved-in” to unreasonable demands 
and sacrificed legitimate land use goals when threatened with a 
RLUIPA claim?  How often has a potential RLUIPA claim led a lo-
cal government to accommodate a reasonable request for relief from 
a regulation that imposed a substantial burden on a religious use or 
treated it in a less than equal manner?  Many more specific questions 
can be posed.140 
In the absence of perfect information about how RLUIPA has af-
fected local governments, this Article argues that the courts have 
adopted a pragmatic approach to maneuvering in the difficult terrain 
that RLUIPA occupies: combining appropriate judicial deference to a 
legislature that enacts a neutral law of general applicability with the 
heightened judicial scrutiny that becomes appropriate when that same 
law is applied to a specific zoning approval, a circumstance that fre-
quently allows for subjectivity in the approval process, and thus, the 
potential for discrimination or arbitrary action against religious uses.  
I conclude that: (1) until proven otherwise, the cost RLUIPA un-
doubtedly imposes on local governments is the price to be paid for in-
suring against the discriminatory or arbitrary application of land use 
regulations, and (2) RLUIPA does not seek to establish an unconsti-
 
 140. See, e.g., Salkin & Lavine, supra note 14, at 257–58 (listing numerous addi-
tional relevant questions). 
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tutional preference for religious uses, but rather a proper accommo-
dation of religious exercise in the land use context. 
